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APPELLATE PROCEDURE-EFFECT OF RECUSALS ON VOTING FOR
REHEARING IN BANC-AFFIRMATIVE VOTE OF MAJORITY OF ALL
CIRCUIT JUDGES IN REGULAR ACTIVE SERVICE, RATHER THAN
MAJORITY OF JUDGES UNRECUSED FROM SUCH VOTE, Is
REQUIRED TO GRANT REHEARING.
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh (1984)
The United States courts of appeals ordinarily hear and decide
cases in panels of threejudges.I However, these courts have the author-
ity to hear or rehear cases in banc, i.e., by all of the circuit judges in
regular active service within the circuit. 2 Section 46(c) of title 28 of the
United States Code and rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
1. See Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 401 (1974) (courts of appeals normally sit in panels of
three judges). Three-judge panels are mandated by statute. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(c) (1982) (cases shall be heard by panel of "not more than three judges").
For the text of § 46(c), see infra note 3.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982). For the text of § 46(c), see infra note 3.
The Evarts Act of 1891 created the courts of appeals and provided that such
courts would "consist of three judges." Comment, supra note 1, at 402 (citing
Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)). Section 117 of the Judi-
cial Code of 1911 preserved the three-judge limitation on the federal courts of
appeals. Comment, supra note 1, at 402 (citing Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231,
§ 117, 36 Stat. 1131, 1131 (1911)). Although § 118 of the Judicial Code in-
creased the number ofjudgeships in three circuits, only one circuit prior to 1938
had ever heard a case with more than three judges sitting. Comment, supra note
1, at 402 (citingJudicial Code of 1911, Ch. 231, § 118, 36 Stat. 1131, 1131
(1911)). In 1938, the Ninth Circuit held that § 117 precluded the hearing and
consideration of a case by more than three judges. Lang's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.), certified question answered, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
In the meantime, the Third Circuit began deciding certain cases while sitting in
banc. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 67-71 (3d Cir.
1940) (in banc), aff'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). The Supreme Court resolved the
conflict by holding unanimously in Textile Mills that § 118 impliedly amended
§ 117 so that a United States court of appeals consisting of more than three
circuit judges could sit and decide a case in banc. 314 U.S. 326, 331-35.
The exercise of the power to sit in banc has been left to the discretion of the
courts of appeals. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345
U.S. 247, 259 (1953). Although the courts of appeals are not compelled to
adopt any particular procedure in exercising their power to sit in banc, any pro-
cedure that is adopted must be "clearly explained, so that members of the court
and litigants in the court may become thoroughly familiar with it." Id. at 267.
See also Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 374 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1963) (Third Cir-
cuit's Internal Operating Procedures were properly within that court's discretion
as delineated in Western Pac. R.R.).
Notwithstanding the discretion accorded courts of appeals, in banc hearings
and rehearings are rare. See Harper, The Breakdown in Federal Appeals, 70 A.B.A.J.
56, 56 (February 1984). Excluding the Federal Circuit, only 66 of the 13,217
cases decided by all of the. United States courts of appeals in the year ending
June 30, 1983, were granted such rehearing. Id.
(908)
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Procedure provide that a court of appeals may exercise its power to sit in
banc by an affirmative vote of a majority of its circuit judges in regular
active service. 3 However, a problem arises when one or more circuit
judges disqualify themselves from voting on whether to sit in banc:4
Should a "majority" of "judges . . . in regular active service" be con-
strued as a majority of all of the circuit judges in active service, or as a
majority of only those judges who actually participate in the vote to hear
or rehear in banc?5
This issue was addressed recently by Judge Adams of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a statement sur petition
3. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982); FED. R. App. P. 35(a). Section 46(c) provides in
pertinent part:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or
panel of not more than three judges ... , unless a hearing or rehearing
before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of
the circuit who are in regular active service .... A court in banc shall
consist of all circuit judges in regular active service.
28 U.S.C. § 46(c). Section 46(c) is a codification of the Supreme Court's holding
in Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(c) reviser's notes; Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345
U.S. 247, 250-51 (1953). For a discussion of the Textile Mills and Western Pac.
R.R. decisions, see supra note 2.
Rule 35(a) provides in pertinent part: "A majority of the circuit judges who
are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other proceeding be
heard or reheard by the court of appeals in banc." FED. R. App. P. 35(a). Like
§ 46(c), Rule 35(a) is essentially a codification of Textile Mills. See Comment,
supra note 1, at 401 n.1.
Senior circuit judges are not considered circuit judges "in regular active
service." See 28 U.S.C. § 294(b) (1982). However, a senior judge is permitted to
sit as a member of an in banc court if he was a member of the panel that heard
the case initially. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982). Section 455 requires that a federal justice,
judge or magistrate disqualify himself where "his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned," or more specifically, where 1) the judge has a personal bias
towards a party "or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding"; 2) either the judge or a prior associate served as an attorney or
as a material witness in the matter; 3) the judge served as an adviser or material
witness in the matter pursuant to government employment; 4) the judge or a
member of his family has a financial interest in the subject matter of, or in a
party to, the proceeding; 5) a member of the judge's family is a party, a lawyer or
a witness in the matter. Id.
The 1974 amendment to § 455 has sparked criticism, most notably from
federal judges, who are subject to the statute's restrictions. See Harper, supra
note 2, at 57. Some judges, for example, have described the new rules gov-
erning judicial disqualification as overreactions to the Watergate scandal and the
rejection of Clement Haynsworth's nomination to the United States Supreme
Court. See id. Another criticism that has been levelled at § 455 is that in certain
types of cases, the same circuit judges have been routinely disqualified so that
too few judges have remained to grant rehearing in banc. Id. at 56-57.
5. Compare Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) (ma-
jority of judges who actually participate in vote to hear or rehear in banc), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984), with Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d
1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972) (majority of all circuit judges in regular active ser-
vice), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See also Harper, supra note 2, at 57.
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for rehearing in Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh.6 In Lewis, two of the ten
active judges on the Third Circuit recused themselves from voting on
the appellant's petition for rehearing. 7 Of the eight remaining judges
who participated in the voting, five voted for rehearing and three voted
against it.8 The Third Circuit's Internal Operating Procedures require
an affirmative vote of a majority of all active judges, whether recused or
not, in order for rehearing in banc to be granted.9 Thus, because only
five of the six active judges necessary to sustain a petition for rehearing
in banc in the Third Circuit voted for rehearing in Lewis, the petition was
denied. 1
In a statement sur petition for rehearing, Judge Adams expressed
his uneasiness with the "procedural dilemma" revealed by the rejection
of the petition."I He was troubled that a panel decision supported by
only a small minority of the court could, because of recusals, be insu-
lated from in banc reconsideration. 12 Judge Adams recognized that
under the Third Circuit's procedure for voting on petitions for rehear-
6. 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983), reh'g and reh'g in banc denied, 725 F.2d 928
(3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 266 (1984). In Lewis, a black woman brought an employment discrimina-
tion action under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, against the University of Pittsburgh and its bookstore, alleging
that she had not been promoted because of her race. 725 F.2d at 912 (citing
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976)). The district court entered judgment for the de-
fendants based on the jury's finding that plaintiff had not been denied promo-
tion on account of race. Id. at 914. A Third Circuit panel, one judge dissenting,
affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that 1) title VII and the civil rights
statutes all require a showing of "but for" causation in employment discrimina-
tion suits; 2) it was not enough for plaintiff to show that race was a "substantial"
or "motivating" factor leading to defendant's decision not to promote her; and
3) the jury was properly instructed on the correct test to be employed in deter-
mining employment discrimination, notwithstanding that the instructions re-
ferred to race in terms of "the determintive factor." Id. at 920.
The plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing which the court denied. Id. at 928
(Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing). See infra notes 7-10 and ac-
companying text. Pursuant to the denial of rehearing in banc, Judge Adams, the
dissenting judge in the panel decision, issued a statement sur petition for re-
hearing discussing the particular Third Circuit procedural rule which had caused
plaintiWs petition to be denied. 725 F.2d at 928-30 (Adams, J., statement sur
petition for rehearing).
7. 725 F.2d at 929 (Adams,J., statement sur petition for rehearing). Judge
Aldisert (now Chief Judge) and Judge Weis recused themselves.
8. Id. at 928 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing). Judges Ad-
ams, Gibbons, Higginbotham, Sloviter, and Becker voted to grant rehearing in
banc, while then Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Hunter and Garth opposed the
petition. Id.
9. 3d CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 9B(4). Procedure 9B(4) provides that
"rehearing in banc shall be ordered only upon the affirmative votes of a majority
of the circuit judges of this court in regular active service."
10. 725 F.2d at 929 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing).
11. Id. at 928 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing).
12. Id. at 929 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing).
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ing in banc, ajudge who disqualifies himself is in effect counted as a vote
against rehearing. 
13
After discussing the goal of intracircuit uniformity underlying the
current practice, 14 Judge Adams noted that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) could be
construed as excluding disqualified judges from the quorum from which
a majority vote is determined.' 5 He also examined the recent trend
among United States courts of appeals to grant in banc consideration
upon an affirmative vote of a majority of nonrecused judges. 16 How-
13. Id. at 928 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing). Judge Ad-
ams reasoned that under the Third Circuit's approach each recusal of a judge
reduces the number of votes needed to deny a petition for rehearing in banc, but
has no effect on the number required to grant such rehearing. Id. at 929. Thus,
disqualification has the effect of a vote for denial. The consequence of this ef-
fect, Judge Adams posited, was that a panel decision supported by only a small
minority of the court could be insulated from reconsideration in banc. Id.
14. Id. Judge Adams explained that the main reason for the Third Circuit's
procedure was that "it insures that major developments in the law of the Circuit
reflect the participation of all members of the Court." Id. Judge Adams hypoth-
esized that if recused judges were not counted as part of the quorum, and five of
the 10 active judges of the Third Circuit were disqualified from a particular case,
settled law of the circuit could be overturned by an affirmative vote of as few as
three members of the 10-member court. Id. Such a result, Judge Adams argued,
would be contrary to Congress' and the Third Circuit's goal of intracircuit uni-
formity, which underlies the authorization of in banc procedures. Id. & nn. 2-4
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1246 (to accompany H.R. 3390), 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941); Hearings on S. 1053 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1941), and quoting 3d CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P.
8C introductory explanation).
15. 725 F.2d at 929-30 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982)). For a discussion of § 46(c), see supra note 3.
Judge Adams observed that the phrase, "judges ... in regular active service,"
presumably was intended to have the same meaning in both sentences of the
statute. 725 F.2d at 929 (Adams,J., statement sur petition for rehearing). More
specifically, Judge Adams noted that under the second sentence of the statute, a
court sitting in banc cannot include recused judges. Id. Consequently, he ex-
plained, reference in the first sentence to a majority of the "judges ... in regular
active service" could similarly be construed to exclude disqualified judges. See
id. at 929-30 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing). Thus, he con-
cluded, the first sentence of § 46(c) could conceivably mean "judges ... in regu-
lar active service [who are not disqualified in a particular case]." Id. (bracketed
phrase by Judge Adams).
16. 725 F.2d at 930 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing).
Judge Adams noted that this new approach has been adopted by the Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Id. (citing Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712
F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) (vote of five judges in favor of rehearing in banc, four
judges against, and one disqualified constitutes order for rehearing in banc by
majority of circuit judges in regular active service for purposes of § 46(c)), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 673
F.2d 1008, 1012 n.l (9th Cir. 1982) (Reinhardt,J., dissenting) (under Ninth Cir-
cuit's "limited en banc rule," rehearing is granted only when votes are cast in
favor of such rehearing by majority of active members of court who are not dis-
qualified from voting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982); 8TH CIR. R. 16(a) ("A
majority of the judges of this Court in regular active service who are actively
participating in the affairs of the court and who are not disqualified in the partic-
4
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ever, Judge Adams concluded that this new approach was not a better
alternative to the traditional approach maintained by the Third Cir-
cuit. 17 He noted his concern with the lack of uniformity among the
courts of appeal as to which approach to use, 18 and suggested that
either Congress or the Supreme Court provide "definitive guidance" at
an early occasion in order to resolve the intercircuit conflict. 19
In reviewingJudge Adams' statement sur petition for rehearing, it is
submitted that whether each circuit should decide for itself what consti-
tutes a majority in voting on petitions for a hearing or rehearing in banc,
or whether the Supreme Court or Congress should decide the matter,
depends on the need for intercircuit uniformity. On the one hand, di-
vergent views among the circuits would seem to defeat the federal judi-
cial system's goal of uniform procedure.2 0 On the other hand, the
United States courts of appeals maintain distinct, individual internal op-
erating procedures concerning a number of administrative matters
which do not appear to have caused any prejudice to litigants in the
federal circuits. 2 1
The better position, it is suggested, is to allow each circuit to decide
for itself what constitutes a majority for purposes of voting on in banc
petitions. The Supreme Court has held that the procedures employed
in the exercise of the power to sit in banc rest in the discretion of the
individual courts of appeals.2 2 In addition, the fact that both the tradi-
ular case or controversy may order a hearing or rehearing en banc."); An-
nouncement of Amended Seventh Circuit Operating Procedures (April 18,
1983) ("A simple majority of the voting active judges is required to grant a re-
hearing en banc.")).
17. 725 F.2d at 930 (Adams, J., statement sur petition for rehearing).
Judge Adams stated: "While I acknowledge that sound reasons have been ad-
vanced to support this new trend, I am not persuaded that it represents the ideal
accommodation of the conflicting demands of fairness to the individual litigant
and stability in a circuit's decisional law." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Judge Adams noted that "the current lack of uniformity among the
circuits on this important issue creates the appearance of rights determined by
happenstance." Id. He added that the Third Circuit should not use its rulemak-
ing power to adopt the new trend. Id.
20. The goal of uniformity in the federal judiciary is illustrated by Con-
gress' adoption of uniform rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.; FED. R. CRIM. P.; FED.
R. EvID.; FED. R. APP. P. These rules, it is submitted, insure that a litigant in
federal court receives equal procedural protections regardless of the federal
court in which his action is filed. As a result, federal court litigants have clear
notice of the procedures to which they are subject, and are discouraged from
"forum shopping."
21. See, e.g., 3d CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P.
22. Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 374 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1963); Western
Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 259 (1953). For a dis-
cussion of Shenker and Western Pacific, see supra note 2. The Supreme Court has
not relied on any statutory authority in holding that the determination of the
procedures for exercising the power to sit in banc rested with the courts of ap-
peals. See Western Pacific, 345 U.S. at 259; Shenker, 374 U.S. at 4-5. It is therefore
912 [Vol. 30: p. 908
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tional and the new approaches possess fair and reasonable justifications
weakens the argument that uniformity is crucial. 23 Finally, regardless of
the approach adopted by a court of appeals for determining what consti-
tutes a majority, in banc hearings and rehearings are rare occurrences 24
and have always been intended to be utilized only under extraordinary
circumstances. 25
While autonomy in determining each circuit's operating procedures
is desirable, increasing criticism directed at both methods of determin-
ing a majority for purposes of section 46(c) may force Congress to at-
tempt adoption of a uniform solution. In fashioning such a solution,
Congress would have to squarely face the two interpretations of what
constitutes a majority for purposes of section 46(c). Under the tradi-
tional approach endorsed by several of the courts of appeals, a petition
for hearing or rehearing in banc may be granted only by an affirmative
vote of a majority of all of the circuit judges in regular active service
within the circuit, whether or not any such judges have been disquali-
fied. 26 The trend in other circuits is to grant in banc consideration upon
suggested that the holdings in these cases merely expressed the Court's belief
that the circuits should be free to fashion their own rules for internal procedure
without unnecessary Supreme Court intervention, provided that such proce-
dures do not exceed constitutional or statutory authority, or otherwise conflict
with congressional action. Thus, it is submitted that the Supreme Court's hold-
ing should not be interpreted as a bar to congressional intervention in the
matter.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue in the more than 20 years
since Shenker was decided, and the Court does not appear willing to change its
position of deference to the circuits. See Harper, supra note 2, at 59. See also In
Re American Broadcasting Cos., 104 S. Ct. 538 (1983), denying mandamus to Clark
v. American Broadcasting Cos., 684 F.2d 1208, 1226 (6th Cir. 1982).
23. For a discussion of the justifications for both approaches, see supra
notes 13-14 & infra notes 26-27.
24. See Harper, supra note 2, at 56 (discussing rare number of instances in
which federal courts of appeals have granted hearing or rehearing in banc).
25. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689
(1960). See infra note 26.
26. See, e.g., Clark v. American Broadcasting Cos., 684 F.2d 1208, 1226 (6th
Cir. 1982) (rehearing in banc denied where five judges voted in favor of petition,
four judges voted against and one was disqualified), mandamus denied sub nor., In
Re American Broadcasting Cos., 104 S. Ct. 538 (1983); Copper & Brass
Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir.
1982), reh'g denied, unpublished order No. 81-2091 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1982) (re-
hearing in banc denied where five judges voted in favor of rehearing, three
judges voted against and two did not participate); Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972) (petition for rehearing in banc denied
where four judges voted in favor of rehearing, three voted against and one was
disqualified), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973). The First Circuit's position is unclear.
See United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 920 (1st Cir. 1980) (vote by major-
ity of three regular active judges to grant rehearing in banc is all that § 46(c)
requires), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980).
The underlying rationale for the traditional view is that in banc considera-
tion is designed to insure that crucial questions regarding the law of the circuit
are decided by a majority of the full court so that intracircuit uniformity is pre-
1985] 913
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an affirmative vote of a majority of only the nonrecused judges. 2 7
served. See United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90(1960). In American-Foreign, the Supreme Court, per Justice Stewart, stated:
The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in banc
is to enable the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by mak-
ing it possible for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby
secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions, while enabling the
court at the same time to follow the efficient and time-saving procedure
of having panels of three judges hear and decide the vast majority of
cases as to which no division exists within the court.
Id. (quoting Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1954)
(explaining Third Circuit's procedure)). Justice Stewart added: "En banc courts
are the exception, not the rule. They are convened only when extraordinary
circumstances exist that call for authoritative consideration and decision by
those charged with the administration and development of the law of the cir-
cuit." 363 U.S. at 689.
Similar policy reasons were articulated in the Zahn decision. In Zahn, a peti-
tion for rehearing in banc was denied where only three of the eight judges of the
Second Circuit in regular active service had voted to deny rehearing. 469 F.2d
at 1040. Four judges had voted in favor of the petition, while one judge had
disqualified himself. Id. In an opinion supportive of the policy which resulted in
the denial of the petition in Zahn, Judge Mansfield argued that § 46(c) and Rule
35(a) are designed to achieve intracircuit uniformity by assuring that crucial
questions concerning the law of the circuit will be decided by the vote of a ma-
jority of the full court rather than by a three-judge panel. Id. at 1041 (Mansfield,
J., on petition for rehearing en banc). For the text of § 46(c) and of Rule 35(a),
see supra note 3. Judge Mansfield argued further that the Second Circuit's strict
majority requirement curtailed the court's ever-increasing workload by prevent-
ing a minority of the members of the court from compelling reconsideration in
banc. Id.
27. See, e.g., Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) (vote
of five judges in favor of rehearing in banc, four judges against and one disquali-
fied constitutes order for rehearing in banc by majority of circuit judges in regu-
lar active service for purposes of § 46(c)), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984); Ford
Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1008, 1012 n.l (9th Cir. 1982)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (under Ninth Circuit's "limited en banc rule," rehear-
ing is granted only when votes are cast in favor of such rehearing by majority of
active members of court who are not disqualified from voting); 8TH CIR. R. 16(a)
("A majority of the judges of this court in regular active service who are actively
participating in the affairs of the court and who are not disqualified in the partic-
ular case or controversy may order a hearing or rehearing en banc."); An-
nouncement of Amended Seventh Circuit Operating Procedures (Apr. 18, 1983)
("A simple majority of the voting active judges is required to grant a rehearing
en banc.").
The new trend was discussed at length by the Fourth Circuit in the Arnold
decision. 712 F.2d at 899-912. Interpreting a 1963 United States Supreme
Court decision, the Fourth Circuit concluded that courts of appeals, when voting
on requests for rehearing in banc, may select for themselves whether a majority
vote shall be based on a quorum consisting of all judges in regular active service,
including those disqualified for purposes of the particular case, or on a quorum
consisting of only those judges in regular active service who have not been so
disqualified. 712 F.2d at 902 (citing Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 374
U.S. 1 (1963)). For a discussion of Shenker, see supra note 2. The dissent in
Arnold disputed the majority's interpretation of Shenker. 712 F.2d at 909-12
(Widener,J., concurring and dissenting). According to the dissent, the Supreme
Court in Shenker had merely affirmed the Third Circuit's decision below that an
absolute majority was required to order rehearing in banc. Id. at 909 (Widener,
914 [Vol. 30: p. 908
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J., concurring and dissenting). Moreover, Judge Widener explained that be-
cause the factual situation in Arnold was identical to that presented in Shenker, the
Supreme Court had had the opportunity to endorse the Arnold majority's posi-
tion, but had chosen not to do so. Id. at 909-10 (Widener, J., concurring and
dissenting). Finally, because adoption of the Arnold majority's position would
have changed the outcome in Shenker, Judge Widener reasoned that the Supreme
Court had effectively rejected that position. Id. It should be noted, however,
that Shenker was decided before recusals became a chronic problem and before
the debate arose over the two views. For a discussion of the history of the
recusal problem, see supra note 4 and accompanying text. Thus, it is submitted
that Shenker is not helpful in resolving the issue.
The Arnold court next analyzed § 46(c) and held that the vote of a majority
of the undisqualified circuit judges in regular active service was sufficient to or-
der rehearing in banc. 712 F.2d at 901. To legitimize its break with tradition,
the Fourth Circuit noted that its holding rested on a construction of § 46(c),
whereas courts that adhered to the traditional approach relied exclusively on
policy considerations. Id. at 904 (citing Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469
F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973)). For a discussion of the
inapplicability of § 46(c) to the resolution of the issues involved here, see infra
notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
The court further argued that a disqualified judge under the traditional ap-
proach in effect counts as a vote against rehearing, thereby affecting the out-
come of the case sought to be reheard in contravention of Congress' intent in
enacting the rules for disqualification of federaljudges. 712 F.2d at 904-05. See
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982) (rules governing disqualification of federal judges). For
a discussion of the federal judge disqualification statute, see supra note 4. How-
ever, as the dissent in Arnold noted, under the new approach advocated by the
majority a disqualified judge in effect counts as a vote in favor of rehearing. See
712 F.2d at 912 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting). This is because a sin-
gle recusal from a pool of 10 voting judges would reduce the number of votes
required to grant a petition for rehearing in banc while having no effect on the
number required to deny the petition. See id Thus, under the new approach
adopted by the Arnold majority, a recused judge could still affect whether the
case would be reheard despite his not participating in the vote, and therefore,
neither the traditional nor the new approach can be fully reconciled with Con-
gress' intent to prevent recusedjudges from affecting the cases in which they are
disqualified. See id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982).
It should be noted that, notwithstanding Judge Widener's analysis in Arnold,
a recusal (or multiple recusals) under the new approach will tend to have a more
equitable effect on the number of votes required to grant or deny a petition for
rehearing than under the traditional approach. Moreover, as the table below
indicates, the effect of recusals under either approach varies depending on
whether the circuit is composed of an odd or even number ofjudges. Under the
traditional approach, the number of affirmative votes required to grant in banc
consideration remains constant regardless of the number of recusals, while the
number of votes necessary to deny consideration decreases by one for each
recusal (except that in odd-numbered circuits, the "single decrease per recusal"
begins with the second recusal). Under the new approach, the number of votes
required to grant in banc consideration decreases by one for every two recusals
(in odd-numbered circuits, the "single decrease per two recusals" begins with
the second recusal), while the number of votes required to den' consideration
decreases at the same rate (except that in even-numbered circuits, the "single
decrease per two recusals" begins with the second recusal). These general rules
are illustrated in the table below.
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Although both approaches are plagued with inequities, 28 it is sub-
mitted that in light of policy considerations the traditional view is the
better view. In banc consideration is designed to allow a majority of the
full court to overrule aberrant panel decisions to maintain intracircuit
UNDER TRADITIONAL APPROACH
No. of
Recusals 10 Judges in Circuit 13 Judges in Circuit
No. of Votes No. of Votes No. of Votes No. of Votes
to Grant to Deny to Grant to Deny
0 6 5 7 6
1 6 4 7 6
2 6 3 7 5
3 6 2 7 4
UNDER NEW APPROACH
No. of
Recusals 10 Judges in Circiut 13 Judges in Circuit
No. of Votes No. of Votes No. of Votes No. of Votes
to Grant to Deny to Grant to Deny
0 6 5 7 7
1 5 5 7 6
2 5 4 6 6
3 4 4 6 5
4 4 3 5 5
5 3 3 5 4
One further point raised by the dissent in Arnold deserves mention. Judge
Widener noted that the 1973 Judicial Conference had submitted to Congress
proposed legislation amending § 46(c) so as to follow the new trend. 712 F.2d
at 911 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 1973 Reports of the Proceed-
ings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 47). According to Judge Widener,
Congress' failure to incorporate the proposal in subsequent amendments to
§ 46(c) indicates its refusal to recognize the position of the proponents of the
new view. Id.
Proponents of the new trend have presented a number of arguments to re-
but the traditionalists' basic premises. First, it has been argued that it is more
important that crucial issues receive in banc consideration than that the vote of a
single judge could block such consideration. Comment, supra note 1, at 420
(citing IBM v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 305 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). See also Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1042
(Timbers, J., dissenting) ("It is especially unfortunate here where the [tradi-
tional] rule operates to permit a minority of the active judges of the Court to deny
en banc reconsideration of one of the more pressing issues of our day.") (em-
phasis by Judge Timbers). Moreover, in the absence of rehearing in banc, the
law of the circuit is being shaped by a minority of the court, namely, a three-
judge panel. See Note, FederalJurisdiction and Practice, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 339,
346 (1972). Finally, although the alternative to the traditional rule permits a
minority of the full court to order rehearing in banc, the decision to order such
rehearing is not a decision on the merits of the case. See id.; Comment, supra
note 1, at 423.
28. For a discussion of the inequities of the two approaches, see supra notes
26-27 and accompanying text.
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uniformity. 29 The new trend not only defeats this underlying purpose of
hearings and rehearings in banc, but it could allow one minority (a ma-
jority of those judges who have not been disqualified) to overrule the
decision of another (the panel which presided over the case initially) on
the merits of a case.30
Although section 46(c) may be construed to support the emerging
view, it is submitted that the statute sheds little light on the problem. 31
The statutory analysis employed by the Fourth Circuit in Arnold and by
Judge Adams in Lewis is logical,32 but it is doubtful that such analysis
reflects congressional intent in enacting section 46(c). 33 Congress could
not have anticipated the problem created by recusals when it enacted
section 46(c) because recusals did not become a chronic occurrence un-
til many years later.34 Thus, it is submitted that the statute should not
be used as a definitive guide to resolving the problem of what consti-
tutes a "majority" for purposes of voting on a petition for rehearing in
banc.
In conclusion, there does not appear to be a solution to the prob-
lem of determining what constitutes a majority for purposes of section
46(c) that does not present both advantages and disadvantages. Com-
mentators have criticized both of the methods currently used. 35
Although the courts of appeals are also divided over which method is
more appropriate, 36 it is submitted that the choice of method properly
should be left to the discretion of the individual circuits, 3 7 and that di-
vergent views among the circuits would cause no substantial prejudice to
litigants. 3 8 In light of the need for uniform decisional law within each
circuit, it is further submitted that of the two methods currently em-
29. See supra note 26.
30. While a vote on a petition for rehearing in banc is not a vote on the
merits, those judges who recuse themselves from the vote on the petition are
indicating that they have some conflict of interest which will disqualify them
from participating in the in banc hearing. Accordingly, only the nonrecused
judges who voted on the petition will vote on the merits of the case. Thus, for
example, where a court of appeals of 10 active judges votes four to three in favor
of rehearing in banc, with three recusals, the in banc court will comprise the
same seven voting judges. In such a hypothetical case, an "in banc" decision,
which can be overturned only by a contrary ruling by the Supreme Court, con-
ceivably could be made by only four of the 10 active judges of the circuit.
31. For the text of § 46(c), see supra note 3.
32. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of the legislative intent underlying § 46(c), see supra
notes 2-3 & 14.
34. See supra note 4.
35. For a discussion of the merits of the two approaches, see supra notes 26-
30 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of the suggestion that each circuit retain the discretion
to decide which method to use, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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ployed by the courts of appeals, the traditional method is preferable.3 9
NealJ. Blaher
39. For a discussion of the advantages of the traditional approach, see supra
notes 26-27.
11
Blaher: Appellate Procedure - Effect of Recusals on Voting for Rehearing
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
